نقش آگاهی محاوره ای بر عملکرد کودکان در تکالیف تئوري ذهن
محورهای موضوعی : روان شناسیسید امیر امین یزدی 1 * , پروانه نيكخواه 2
1 - دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد
2 - دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران
کلید واژه: تئوری ذهن, باور کاذب, آگاهی محاوره‌ای, مهارت‌های کلامی,
چکیده مقاله :
چكيده: كودكان با داشتن توانایی‌ای به نام "تئوری ذهن"، به بازنمايي باور انسان‌ها و در نتيجه، درك و پيش‌بيني رفتار آنان قادر مي‌گردند. زبان در تحول تئوري ذهن و نيز عملكرد كودكان در تكاليف باور كاذب نقش مهمی ايفا مي‌كند. تحقیقات نشان می‌دهند که کودکان زیر چهار سال معمولاً در تکالیف باور کاذب شکست می‌خورند. در مورد دلايل شكست كودكان خردسال در تكاليف باوركاذب، دو رويكرد عمده وجود دارند كه يكي از آنها، عدم تحول مفهومي در توانايي تئوري ذهن را دليل شكست مي‌داند (نظريه نقص مفهومي) و ديگري، رشد محدود ظرفيت‌هاي زباني را (نظريه محدوديت عملكرد). 111 كودك در دو گروه با میانگین‌های 3 سال و 5 ماه، و 4 سال و 5 ماه، در دو تكليف كلامي و تصويري باور كاذب ("استاندارد" و "نگاه اول")، و نيز در درك آگاهي محاوره‌اي، مورد آزمون قرار گرفتند. نتايج نشان داد كه عملكرد هر دو گروه از كودكان در تـكاليف باور كاذبـي كه از لـحاظ محاوره‌اي تـسهيل شده بودند ("نگاه اول")، در مـقايسه با عملكرد آنان در تكاليف استاندارد باور كاذب، به‌طور معناداري بهبود يافت. همچنين، بين نمره‌های آزمون آگاهي محاوره‌ای و تكاليف باور كاذب، رابطة معناداري به‌دست آمد. اين نتايج، نظريه محدوديت عملكرد را تأييد مي‌كند كه می‌گوید شكست كودكان سه ساله در تكاليف استاندارد باور كاذب، نه به دليل ناتواني مفهومي آنان در بازنمايي باور كاذب (چنانكه در نظريه نقص مفهومي بيان مي‌شود)، بلكه به دليل محدوديت دانش زباني آنان است. بر اين اساس، ضرورت دارد تا سطح تحول يافتگي زباني كودكان، در سنجش و تبيين چگونگي رشد تئوري ذهن كودكان مورد توجه قرار گيرد.
Abstract: By developing theory of mind ability, children are able to represent human beliefs and therefore, understand and predict their behavior. Language plays an important role in developing children's theory of mind and their performance in false belief tasks. There are two main approaches explaining younger children’s failure in false belief tasks. First, it is believed that 3 year-olds lack the conceptual ability to represent false beliefs (Conceptual Deficiency Theory). Second, it is assumed that undeveloped language capacities mask 3 year-olds' theory of mind abilities (Performance Limitation Theory). In the present study, the assumptions of these two approaches have been investigated. Participants (111 three and four year-olds) were tested in two verbal and pictorial false belief tasks (“standard” and "Look First") and a conversational awareness task. The findings showed that both 3 and 4 year-olds performed significantly better on the facilitated false belief tasks (Look First) than standard false belief tasks. There was also a significant correlation between children's performance on false belief and conversational awareness tasks. Results are in favor of the Performance Limitation Theory. The 3 year-olds' failure in false belief tasks seems to be the result of their undeveloped language ability, not due to their conceptual inability to represent false beliefs. It is necessary to take children's language ability into account in any assessment and explanation of theory of mind.
امین¬یزدی، سید امیر (1383). تحولات استدلال "نظریه ذهن" در کودکان. مجله مطالعات تربیتی و روانشناسی، دوره پنجم، شماره اول، 67-43.
امین¬یزدی، سید امیر (1386). شناخت اجتماعي و زبان. مجله دانشكده ادبيات و علوم انسانی. شماره چهارم، سال چهلم، 134-115.
Amin Yazdi, A., German, T. P., Defeyter, M. A.,& Siegal, M. (2006). Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief? Cognition, 100, 343-368.
Apperly, I. A. (2008). Beyond simulation-theory and theory-theory: Why social cognitive neuroscience should use its own concepts to study ‘‘theory of mind’’, Cognition, 107, 266-283.
Apperly, I. A., & Obinson, E. J. (2008). Children’s mental representation of referential relations. Cognition, 67, 287-309.
Astington, J. W. (1991). Intention in the child's theory of mind. In: D. Frye, C. Moore (Eds.), Children's theories of mind. In: Mental states and social understanding, (pp. 157-172). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Astington, J. W., & Gopink, A. (1991). Theatrical explanation of children understanding of the mind. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 7-31.
Bloom, P., & German, T. P. (2000). Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind. Cognition, 77, 25-31.
Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., & Claxton, L. J. (2004). Individual differences in executive functioning and theory of mind: An investigation of inhibitory control and planning ability. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 87, 299-319.
Donaldson, M. (1978). Children’s minds. Glasgow: Fontana.
Joseph, R. M. (1998). Intention and knowledge in preschooler’s conception of pretend. Child Development, 69, 966-980.
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In R. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts, 6, 345-359.
Kloo, D., Perner, J., Aichhorn, M., & Schmidhuber, N. (2010). Perspective taking and cognitive flexibility in the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task. Cognitive Development, 25, 208-217.
Leslie, A. M. (1986). The childs understands of the mental world-pretence, theory of mind and autism. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 39, 140.
Leslie, A. M. (1994). Tomm, Toby, and agency: Core architecture and domain specificity. In S. A. G. Lawrence & A. Hirschfeld (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture. (pp. 119-148). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Leslie, A. M. (2000). 'Theory of mind' as a mechanism of selective attention. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd Edition, (pp. 1235-1247). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lewis, C., & Osborn, A. (1990). Three-year olds problems with false belief: Conceptual deficit or linguistic artifact? Child Development, 61, 1514-1519.
Pellicano, E. (2007). Links between theory of mind and executive function in young children with autism: Clues to developmental primacy. Developmental Psychology, 43, 4, 974-990.
Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Perner, J. (1994). Higher-order beliefs and intentions in children's understanding of social interaction. In W. Astington, P. L., Harris, D. R. Olson (Eds.), Developing theory of mind (pp.271-294 ). Cambridge, UK:
University Press.
Perner, J., Ruffman, T., & Leekan, S. R. (1994). Theory of mind is contagious: You catch it from your sibs. Child development, 65, 1228-
1238.
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (2001). Minds, modules, and meta-analysis. Child Development, 72, 696-701.
Siegal, M., & Beattie, K. (1991). Where to look first for children’s knowledge of false beliefs. Cognition, 38, 1-12.
Siegal, M. (1997). Knowing children: Experiments in conversation and cognition (Vol.2). Hove, Psychology Press.
Siegal, M. (1999). Language and thought: The fundamental significance of conversational awareness for cognitive development. Developmental Science, 2, 1-34.
Snow, C., Pan, B., Imbens-Bailey, A., & Herman, J. (1996). Learning how to say what one means: A longitudinal study of children’s speech act use. Social Development, 5, 56-84.
Surian, L., & Leslie, A. M. (1999). Competence and performance in false belief understanding mind: Connections in autism. In S. Baron-Cohen & H. Tager-Flusberg, D. Cohen (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspective from developmental cognitive neuroscience (pp. 124-149). New York: Oxford University Press.
Surian, L., Baron-Cohen, S., & Van der Lely, H. (1996). Are children with autism deaf to Gricean maxims? Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 1, 1-17.
Waters, L. J., Siegal, M., & Slaughter, V. (2000). Development of reasoning and the tension between scientific and conversational inference. Social Development, 9, 383-396.
Wellman, H. M. (1988). First steps in the child's theorizing about the mind. In J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris, & D. R. Olson (Eds.), Developing theories of mind (pp. 64-92). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children’s reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684.
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103-128.